The problem is that the 'organization of matter' is always plural and, therefore, subject to power claims. Your critique is only valid if we assume a monist-immanentist view of matter. Rather, I believe that Matter is partes extra partes, which followed what Plato described in the Sophist, i.e., the principle of symploké (things are neither all related to all, nor none related to none, but rather some with others; some are connected with others and disconnected from others.)
Matter is plural but its register of plurality (the measure/golden mean/etc) is taken as common ground for each power claimant (civilizations assume a common ground for war to be possible). "Absolute" war is a difference in the register of plurality and hence *not* a power-claim (rather, it is something like a hierarchy/transcendence -> condemnation of a false/relative measure).
"Disconnection" is itself a connection. Things need not be monist to be "whole". Especially a whole which replaces another (world-pictures - constantly replacing each other in the manner of a movie). Hence, the moment we say a world-picture has replaced another; we have asserted the objectivity of both world-pictures. This is how things stand:
1) Either we have common ground (the essence of the Ought) and hence we make power-claims.
2) Or we don't have any common ground and hence we do not make any power-claim (the economy does not "claim" politics, religion does not "claim" civil society, etc).
In both of these cases, each respective Ought is preserved. The key is really to understand "Ought" as self-divided into poles.
I agree with you that conceiving of totality (or totalization) does not require being a monist. Now, the question is that the 'essence of the Ought' will always be a disputed essence, as it lacks transcendental validity—that is, an otherworldly arbiter.
That said, I do believe Kondylis ironically positions himself from the hubris of a zero point (a vision of God). However, unlike you, he is unwilling to make the speculative leap: "Hence, the moment we say a world-picture has replaced another, we have asserted the objectivity of both world-pictures."
Here, the 'essence of the Ought' would be the material horizon of a specific meaning. Around this are power claims made (such as nomad/sedentary, left/right, city/state). Changing this horizon changes the Ought division completely.
I say that Oughts are preserved because to replace a previous picture means to contain it. Otherwise, we are still at the level of opposition on a common horizon, not replacement.
Most of these debates come from the post-Kant divide. Either the side of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Deleuze or the side of Hegel, Marx, and Lacan.
I don’t think we’re going to reach common ground here, as I have wholeheartedly embraced Kondylis’s nihilistic methodological Neo-Kantianism (Power and Decision). However, at the level of my will, and without prejudice to romanticism, I remain a Hegelian.
That said, speaking from my understanding (and not my will), the preservation of the Ought is merely a preservation in form, not in content. It is ghostly—a columbarium. And, in any case, it is also subservient to the class that gave birth to that specific mapping.
Great, I am also a follower of Hegel. But indeed, this is a big issue I see in non-Hegelian "post-Kantianism" and "Neo-Kantianism". I think an unjustified pessimism lurks above it. I see it as opposed to both Kant's and Hegel's original projects, so I do not think it can be justified through them. Maybe someone else can...
But since you seem convinced, I will respect that. Take it far and explore it!
The problem is that the 'organization of matter' is always plural and, therefore, subject to power claims. Your critique is only valid if we assume a monist-immanentist view of matter. Rather, I believe that Matter is partes extra partes, which followed what Plato described in the Sophist, i.e., the principle of symploké (things are neither all related to all, nor none related to none, but rather some with others; some are connected with others and disconnected from others.)
Matter is plural but its register of plurality (the measure/golden mean/etc) is taken as common ground for each power claimant (civilizations assume a common ground for war to be possible). "Absolute" war is a difference in the register of plurality and hence *not* a power-claim (rather, it is something like a hierarchy/transcendence -> condemnation of a false/relative measure).
"Disconnection" is itself a connection. Things need not be monist to be "whole". Especially a whole which replaces another (world-pictures - constantly replacing each other in the manner of a movie). Hence, the moment we say a world-picture has replaced another; we have asserted the objectivity of both world-pictures. This is how things stand:
1) Either we have common ground (the essence of the Ought) and hence we make power-claims.
2) Or we don't have any common ground and hence we do not make any power-claim (the economy does not "claim" politics, religion does not "claim" civil society, etc).
In both of these cases, each respective Ought is preserved. The key is really to understand "Ought" as self-divided into poles.
I agree with you that conceiving of totality (or totalization) does not require being a monist. Now, the question is that the 'essence of the Ought' will always be a disputed essence, as it lacks transcendental validity—that is, an otherworldly arbiter.
That said, I do believe Kondylis ironically positions himself from the hubris of a zero point (a vision of God). However, unlike you, he is unwilling to make the speculative leap: "Hence, the moment we say a world-picture has replaced another, we have asserted the objectivity of both world-pictures."
Here, the 'essence of the Ought' would be the material horizon of a specific meaning. Around this are power claims made (such as nomad/sedentary, left/right, city/state). Changing this horizon changes the Ought division completely.
I say that Oughts are preserved because to replace a previous picture means to contain it. Otherwise, we are still at the level of opposition on a common horizon, not replacement.
Most of these debates come from the post-Kant divide. Either the side of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Deleuze or the side of Hegel, Marx, and Lacan.
I don’t think we’re going to reach common ground here, as I have wholeheartedly embraced Kondylis’s nihilistic methodological Neo-Kantianism (Power and Decision). However, at the level of my will, and without prejudice to romanticism, I remain a Hegelian.
That said, speaking from my understanding (and not my will), the preservation of the Ought is merely a preservation in form, not in content. It is ghostly—a columbarium. And, in any case, it is also subservient to the class that gave birth to that specific mapping.
Great, I am also a follower of Hegel. But indeed, this is a big issue I see in non-Hegelian "post-Kantianism" and "Neo-Kantianism". I think an unjustified pessimism lurks above it. I see it as opposed to both Kant's and Hegel's original projects, so I do not think it can be justified through them. Maybe someone else can...
But since you seem convinced, I will respect that. Take it far and explore it!